Winning the War on Terror

People complain that the War on Terror is stupid because you can't fight a war against a method. I disagree. The war can be won. Here's how:

Definitions first. The War on Terror will be won when terrorism can once again be treated as a law enforcement problem instead of as a military problem. Right now there are two kinds of terrorists: the ones who pose a military challenge, and the ones who pose only a law enforcement challenge. The former kind operates freely in lawless states (Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Somalia), using them to train, gather, and recruit. These groups are large, often resembling militias, and are sometimes state-supported. The other kind of terrorist is the homegrown variety, like those who attacked London's subways and buses. We will never be able to eliminate homegrown terrorists, but when we eliminate the larger militia-like terrorists, we will have won.

Defeating terrorism therefore requires two things: eliminating state sponsors of terrorism, and eliminating failed states where terrorists can operate. It might be tempting to eliminate state sponsors of terror by force, but that misses the point. That would only be a temporary solution; states could always start sponsoring terrorists again when our backs are turned. Winning that part of the war means creating conditions worldwide where it becomes so unacceptable to support terrorists that no self-interested state would ever do it. As for the other condition, eliminating failed states may be impossible, but failed states do not have to become bases for terrorists. Africa is populated by failed states, but with the exception of Somalia, there are no terrorist bases, despite half of Africa being Muslim (since when did Africa become a place to look up to?). Winning this part of the war will require people everywhere to refuse to support international terrorists operating in their countries.

To eliminate state sponsors of terrorism, people have to hold their governments responsible for economic development. This has already happened in an unlikely place: China. Chinese people are the most nationalistic in the world, and yet the only responsibility they hold their government to is that it continues to facilitate economic growth. If the Chinese government were to fight a war abroad, the social and economic upheaval that would follow would threaten the continued existence of the communist party. Last year, in a surprising moment of candor, Chinese President Hu Jintao told Bush on a visit Washington D.C., that Bush need not worry about China on the international stage, because the Chinese government had its hands full with domestic instability, preventing any Chinese adventurism for the foreseeable future. It is unusual a head of state to tell the president of a rival country, "Our threats are all bullshit. There's no way we could carry any of them out."

China therefore serves as a shining example of what we want the world to be. But China's economic growth had little to do with US policies, so for answers on what the US can do to facilitate this transition, we turn to Libya. The US and Europe have for a long time offered to lift sanctions against Libya and engage the country economically and politically if Col. Gadhafi renounced terrorism. He finally did so last year. As a result, he is respected even more at home now, and a pampered statesman when he goes abroad (pictured is him shaking hands with EU Commission President Romano Prodi). Most importantly for the US, Libya no longer sponsors terrorism, and the success that country has met with its policy change can now serve as a model for other rogue regimes wanting to come out of the cold. The lessons from this episode are that the US should stand strong on key issues like terrorism and weapons proliferation, but offer not just punishment, but also significant incentives for cooperation. This approach seems distasteful because it requires the US to ignore human rights violations and anti-democratic policies. But the benefits to US interests are undeniable, even if the methods are unsavory. Of course many rogue nations will still refuse to cooperate. If the US and Europe actively engage countries around the world and truly support their economies, then the rogue nations will gradually be left behind in the stone age, and their people will demand answers. In the middle east, North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) and Jordan are ready for this sort of economic support.

The second condition to win the War on Terror is for people around the world to refuse to support international terrorists operating in their countries. Citizens of failed states support international terrorists when they feel oppressed by international powers like the US, often because the US is intervening in their country in order to fight those very international terrorists (paradox!). Further US intervention can only breed greater resentment and greater support for these terrorists. There is only one proven method for fighting radical islamist terrorists: the age-old "divide and conquer" strategy.

Extremist movements are almost always composed of groups that share the same goals but differ in how far they are willing to go. The spectrum of terrorist groups ranges from groups that are willing to negotiate and only target police or military, to groups that refuse to negotiate and kill civilians without discretion. Terrorists on opposite ends of the spectrum are disgusted by each other, and would love to kill each other, but don't because they are united by a common enemy. This situation is ripe for deal making. In exchange for real political concessions, the more moderate terrorists will almost always be open to laying down their arms, and maybe even fighting alongside the government. Luckily for us, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda wannabes are of the more extreme variety, and so there is the very real possibility that we can crush international terrorism by adopting a policy of befriending moderate, reasonable terrorists who resent the presence of international terrorists on their soil. This has worked before in Algeria, as I wrote about last week. And it could have worked in Iraq. In the first couple years of the insurgency, many Sunni militants were fighting for political reasons, and were only allied with international terrorists like al-Qaeda because they were fighting Americans. The moderate Sunni terrorist groups repeatedly approached the Americans about cutting a deal, but the American ideology of "we don't negotiate with terrorists" got in the way.

I do, however, still support the US policy of not negotiating with terrorists in hostage situations and the like. The idea of that policy is that granting concessions to terrorists will just encourage more terrorism. What I am advocating for the Middle East is different. I am advocating political concessions to local, nationalistic groups that enjoy a wide base of support. In other words, treating terrorist militias with legitimate constituencies like political partners. The difference between the two policies is that my idea revolves around negotiating with terrorist groups not because we are scared of what they will do (as is the case in hostage situations), but because they represent a large enough interest that they deserve to be treated like adults. It is the same idea as negotiating with a political party; it's just that in some parts of the world, political parties have guns.

Fighting the War on Terror my way will take a long time. Decades. However, our next president has the opportunity to lay the foundations for our strategy. In the 1950s, Harry Truman laid the foundations for how we would fight the Cold War. His ideas seemed out of touch and radical, and back then, he was not a very well-regarded president. Today, he is considered one of the greatest. We should be like Harry.

How To Fight Radical Muslims

These days, Islamic fundamentalism seems impossible to beat: we can’t not fight it, but if we do fight it, it only creates more radicals. We can't figure it out, the Europeans can't figure it out, even the Israelis can't figure it out. There is, however, one instance when a militant Islamist movement was defeated: the Algerian Civil War. It’s a story that is not well known in the western world, but holds important lessons for fighting radical Islam.

Ten years ago, the government of Algeria was mired in a brutal civil war against a radical Islamist insurgency. From 1992 until when the situation began to stabilize in 1999, approximately 150,000 people were killed, most of them civilians. Today the war is all but over. The government estimates that there are 300 to 500 insurgents remaining. Defeating a radical Islamist insurgency that enjoys a wide base of popular support is no small feat, as many involved in counterinsurgency efforts in countries like Iraq and Israel have discovered. The government succeeded by isolating the most radical elements of the insurgency and turning the more moderate groups against them. The key to this effort was an aggressive reconciliation program that had as its centerpiece an amnesty for all but the most brutal insurgents, and programs to reintegrate these individuals back into society. Subsequent offers of amnesty gradually encouraged many of the increasingly demoralized hold-outs to disarm.

The two primary militant Islamist groups in Algeria were the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The FIS began the war in 1992 after the military cancelled an election that the FIS was on the verge of winning. Throughout the conflict, the FIS maintained clear political objectives and was always willing to negotiate with the government. The GIA, on the other hand, saw armed struggle as the only way to establish their desired Islamic state. The GIA developed a reputation for targeting foreigners and Algerian civilians, while the FIS only espoused armed struggle against the government and security forces. Although the two organizations started out on friendly terms, soon the FIS criticized began criticizing the GIA for “distorting the Islamic Plan, committing crimes and deviating from the legitimate programme,” and complained that the GIA’s brutal tactics were damaging the reputation of the FIS. Bloodshed between the two groups started in 1994 and 1995, with the assassinations of several leaders from both sides. By 1997, the FIS had had enough, and began aligning with Algerian security forces against the GIA.

The Algerian president, Bouteflika, who the military installed in 1999, took advantage of these rifts in the insurgency to isolate the GIA. Within months of coming to office, Bouteflika granted blanket amnesty to FIS militants, and released thousands of Islamic militants from prison. The military wing of the FIS responded by “surrendering to the authority of the state.” Further amnesties led to desertions from within the ranks of the GIA. To further build trust, Bouteflika released another 2000 prisoners this year, and championed a new Charter for Peace and Reconciliation that provides for compensation for detainees. The GIA has splintered and gradually dissolved as a result of these measures, and now in 2006, only disorganized, scattered militant groups remain.

The path that Bouteflika has advocated is inherently a very uncomfortable path to take because the most important and effective policies have also been the most morally suspect. The most recent amnesty excludes only those who are guilty of rape, mass-murder, and detonating bombs in public places. Furthermore, the new Charter absolves the military establishment of wrongdoing, and in return, offers rehabilitation to the Islamists. With both terrorists and government war criminals walking free, Bouteflika’s policy has left some very raw wounds unhealed. Opponents from both sides of the war have argued that there can never be true peace until those who committed atrocities are held accountable. They fail to realize, however, that this is in fact the essential ingredient of the ceasefire: when everyone has sinned, the only way to start over is if nobody is being held accountable.

Although the future of Algeria is still unclear, for the first time in nearly fifteen years, the country is stable enough to develop its economy and society. The key to Algeria’s stabilization has been the government’s willingness to grant amnesty to those with blood on their hands. The US rejected a similar amnesty plan in Iraq in 2004, and Israel faces a similar problem in terms of how to deal with Palestinian detainees and militants. The Bouteflika approach may not be appropriate for all countries, but at its core it is just the age-old strategy divide and conquer. Dividing terrorists, however, requires an honest dialogue and a willingness to forgive them. It feels wrong, but it’s the only way.

Interesting Article

The lack of skilled workers in Asia (especially in China) is a rapidly developing and underreported story.

Check it out.

Putin Plays Bush Like a Harmonica

Watching Russian President Vladimir Putin is like watching a great artist in action, and at the recent G8 summit in Germany he painted another masterpiece. In general in art, the artist begins with an idea that he sees with his mind's eye, but as he begins to paint, his work inevitably comes out differently than intended. Some artists struggle to retain their original idea, patching up their work to make it as close as possible to their original vision. They end up dissatisfied, left with a piece that only aspires to match the original inspiration. Truly great artists, however, accept the imperfections and seize new opportunities that were not there before. The result is a piece of art that is still fundamentally what the artist had in mind, but with exciting and stunning changes that make the piece far more exciting than if it had all gone according to plan.

Vladimir Putin, the ex-KGB colonel, came to power in 1999 with a vision of a strong Russia like the one he grew up in. He went to work with the artist's equivalent of a blemished canvas and contaminated paint wells. Russia at that time was emerging from a banking crisis that shook the faith of people worldwide in the benefits of capitalism. In 1996 the Russian army lost a guerrilla war in Chechnya, a province about the size of Connecticut. Government employees were not being paid, the military was deteriorating, average life span was decreasing, and corruption had seeped into every aspect of life. To top it off, Putin came to power by appointment (instead of election), taking over a post previously occupied by a raging alcoholic.

Putin captured the hearts of the Russian people when soon after taking office, he crushed the Chechen rebellion in a war that made dictators around the world blush. He retook control of the economy, strengthened the central government, and balanced the budget (it helps that oil prices have skyrocketed recently). Returning to the art analogy, all of this was the equivalent of a very dramatic painting. What political art connoisseurs really appreciate however, is the improvisation that went into his work.

When President Bush laid out his post-Sept. 11 vision of a democratic world, free of oppression and authoritarian leaders, Russia posed a problem. It was apparent that Putin was scaling back Russia's democratic freedoms by closing down newspapers and jailing rivals. Furthermore, reports leaking out of Chechnya told horror stories of Russian soldiers kidnapping, torturing and massacring civilians. Pictures of Chechnya's capital, Grozny, were reminiscent of Stalingrad or Dresden in WWII. Putin moved preemptively to silence possible US criticism, framing the war in Chechnya as part of the worldwide War on Terror. As an ally in the War on Terror, he became immune to American criticism, including to criticism of his anti-democratic domestic policies. Meanwhile, Bush and his aides spent their first term ducking questions about the friendship between the two countries.

Grozny, post-Putin

Most recently, America's relationship with Russia has been strained by US plans to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, ostensibly to defend against rogue nations like Iran. Russia isn't buying it. The plan would place radar stations and anti-missile batteries in the Czech Republic and Poland, which geographically seems to be aimed more at Russia than at Iran. Putin has threatened a new nuclear arms race, the US has ignored the threats, and the situation has escalated. For Putin, this situation was the artistic equivalent of a painting gone wrong; it seemed that no matter what he did, this missile defense system would get built, and US power would extend into further into what used to be Russia's sphere of influence. But then at last week's G8 summit in Germany, Putin called NATO's bluff.

At the beginning of the summit, Putin announced that Azerbaijan had agreed to be have the missile defense system based in its territory, and that the stations in Poland and the Czech Republic were now no longer necessary. This unexpected development threw the Americans into confusion, and has placed them in a very uncomfortable situation. Azerbaijan is too close to Iran for the system to be useful, and the country itself is weak, unstable and uncooperative with western powers. But if the US turns down the proposal, it will seem to vindicate the Russian argument that the missile defense system is directed against them. US diplomats have suggested that they would offer to incorporate the Russian plan into the current plan, putting radar stations in all three countries. But that won't fly. If the US agrees to incorporate Azerbaijan into the system, then it will effectively be saying that the Azerbaijan station would be useful defending against Iranian missile attacks. But then if the Azerbaijan station is usable, why are the the Polish and Czech stations still necessary? Wham. Putin has turned the tables, trapping the US in an awkward lose-lose situation, and making Russia suddenly look like the side conscientiously trying to negotiate a settlement. Magnifico.

Many people justifiably find Putin to be a villainous figure. It might sound like I have a man-crush on him, but I only admire his methods, not necessarily his policies. He gets things done in a country where nothing has gotten done in decades. He is a political artist. You might not like what he paints, but you have to admit that he paints well.

Turkey to Attack Iraq

Turkey was always afraid that the US invasion of Iraq would strengthen Northern Iraq's Kurdish pseudo-state. The Kurds of northern Iraq today are self governed, have a formidable militia (the peshmerga), and even have their own flag (shown here). As Baghdad burns to the ground, the Kurdish controlled portion of northern Iraq is relatively free of violence. But the region is also home to Kurdish terrorist groups that carry out attacks in Turkey. With these groups operating freely within Iraq, and Turkey on edge after a series of recent attacks, Ankara has threatened several times to attack terrorist bases within Iraqi Kurdistan, but has not yet done so, partly as a courtesy to the United States.

Tensions are rising as Turkey has begun a substantial troop buildup at the Iraqi border. On June 7, unofficial reports suggested that Turkish commandos in pursuit of Kurdish rebels entered a couple miles into Iraq before turning back. Brief raids inside Iraqi territory like this one have happened in the past, but the last time there was a large-scale Turkish operation inside Iraqi territory was in 1997, when 50,000 troops crossed the border to flush out rebels.

Further background from FT.com:

"There is an intense internal debate in Turkey about whether Ankara should push across the border to root out guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), based inside the Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq. Turkey accuses the PKK of launching attacks inside Turkish territory.

The Turkish government, which faces a general election next month, has appeared so far to want to avoid a military incursion. But a bomb attack in Ankara two weeks ago in which six people were killed, has been blamed on Kurdish separatists and put the issue of terrorism, and Turkey’s appropriate response to it, at the top of the election agenda.

The military holds a spring offensive in the region every year, but the build-up in recent days has taken on an ominous dimension amid ever-louder rhetoric from Turkey’s senior generals about the need to crush PKK fighters."

Barring any dramatic terrorist attacks, Turkey is not about to launch a large-scale attack - not while Iraq remains America's pet-project. When the US withdraws in 2008, however (see "When the US Will Withdraw from Iraq," June 3, 2007), the Kurds will move to increase their independence, likely leading to increased cross-border terrorist activity. These attacks will provide justification for Turkish military retaliation, just as the US backs out. If the US begins withdrawing around May 2008, expect Turkish airstrikes and raids to begin a year later in the spring of 2009. Large ground forces will follow only if Turkey feels that its justification is strong enough that the move will not jeopardize its bid to join the EU.

Turkey is unlikely to have such a compelling justification, so as 2009 approaches, look for relatively frequent, small-scale, targeted, precision attacks.

When US Troops Will Withdraw From Iraq

Just as an army on the field of battle will call for a temporary cease fire as it waits for reinforcements, the Democrats have agreed to postpone the debate on Iraq War funding until September when the failure of the troop surge will be obvious, and there will be greater support for a withdrawal. In September the fight will pick up where it left off, with Democrats calling for a withdrawal, and the President saying that the war is going well and a withdrawal is premature. Various bills will work their way around Capital Hill until sometime in October, when the President will finally agree to some sort of compromise. The most likely one being a decrease in the size of the US force, with further withdrawals determined by set benchmarks. By the beginning of 2008, the continued US presence in Iraq will be a huge liability for the Republican party as it gears up for elections later that year. President Bush, not wanting his legacy to include the destruction of the party that Ronald Reagan built, will declare victory and begin a troop withdrawal (leaving only a handful of bases). The withdrawal will rob the Democrats of their rallying point, leveling the playing field in time for elections.

Severe ethnic cleansing will ensue.